The Maxwell School's Government Performance Project recently rated the management successes of the 50 states in several areas, such as capital management, human resources and information technology. Variability among the states was significant. Viewing the Maxwell School data as something to be explained, we focus on political institutions, social characteristics and the economic environments in the states. We review hypotheses that predict management performance, and we test them empirically. We are especially interested in the relationship between social capital and the management performance of states. We find that states high in social capital, states with professional legislatures, and states with vibrant entrepreneurial economies are more likely to be better managed. A state's tax burden and the governor's powers seem unrelated to the Maxwell School scores. States with a high density of "good government" groups tend to be poor performers, presumably because citizens join such groups with the hopes of improving poorly performing state governments.
Introduction
To General George Washington awaiting the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, recalcitrant Rhode Island was "Rogues' Island," a land of scandals and petty politics. The fact that states varied in their capacities to govern vexed the Founding Fathers. Indeed, stark differences in the governability of the states helped doom the Articles of Confederation and boosted the call for a strong national government. Two hundred twenty years later, Rhode
Island remains among the worst managed state governments, according to recent studies by the Maxwell School of Government at Syracuse University. A similar study examining the implementation of new management techniques showed Rhode Island among the nation's least likely states to implement change (Brudney, Herbert & Wright 1999) . By contrast, Virginia's government, which George Washington and Thomas Jefferson identified as an effective counterpoint to Rhode Island, continues to be well managed and is more likely to adopt new management techniques.
Why are some states well managed while others fair so poorly? Trying to measure how well a state's government is managed is maddenly difficult (Forsythe 2001) , and there is growing concern among scholars that states may be adapting their behaviors to pass sometimes-arbitrary performance measures rather than improving public management per se (Hatry 2002) . Nonetheless, we are encouraged by recent progress that has, for the most part, been driven by research radiating from Maxwell School scholars involved in the "Government Performance Project" or GPP (Ingraham & Kneedler 2000) .
Explanations of better or worse public management typically raise concepts that have been difficult to measure. Some states have active voters and interest group communities, and there is a clear relationship between citizen mobilization and the responsiveness of politicians (Erikson, Wright & McIver 1993; Hill & Leighley 1996; Gray & Lowrey 1996) . A few states have traditionally been more likely to implement innovative programs, acting as little laboratories for democracy, while other states adopt policies only after they have been tried elsewhere (Walker 1969 , Gray 1973 , Hays 1996 , Mintrom 1997 . Successful state-level policy innovations should be treasured, rewarded and replicated (Altshuler & Behn 1997 , Light 1998 ). On the negative side of the ledger, corruption, which varies widely among the states, brews from a state's history and political culture (Meier & Holbrook 1992 , Elazar 1984 . Since political institutions and policy outcomes vary widely, the 50 states make "an excellent testing ground for studying the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes" (Besley & Case 2001: 1) .
We are intrigued by results from a growing literature linking "social capital" and government performance. Social capital is "broadly conceptualized as the shared resource produced by trust in others, which in turn enables individuals to participate in organized networks that maximize political influence on those in power" (Pierce, Lovrich & Moon 2002: 381; also Uslaner 2002a & 2002b , Putnam 2000 , Skocpol & Fiorina 1999 , Fukuyama 1995 . State histories of social capital are related to the ability of states to adopt social service programs in the 1880s, 1930s and 1990s (Rice & Arnett 2001) . More broadly defined, a state's "civic culture" is, by mechanisms still unclear, strongly correlated with the successful delivery of public policies (Rice & Sumberg 1997) . The quality of a city's roads and local services is higher in communities rich in social capital (Rice 2001) , and a recent study of 20 large U.S. cities found a strong relationship between the presence of fraternal organizations and five measures of how well those cities were managed (Pierce, Lovrich & Moon 2002 ).
We are eager, then, to explore the possible connection between Putnam's measure of social capital and the management performance of the states in the late 1990s.
Although the economic outlook since 2001 has been bleak, especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, the 1990s were unprecedented good times for state governments. With federal authority devolving, and the longest running bull-market in U.S. history, states found themselves richer and more powerful than at anytime since the expansion of the federal government following the Great Depression. States took advantage of their prosperity in a variety of ways, cutting taxes, building surpluses, updating their systems, and providing additional services. Yet even with greater resources, the management of state governments has been very uneven. Good management practicesincluding handling personnel, overseeing budgets, and planning with an eye on the futureare precursors to being able to implement state programs successfully (Ingraham, Joyce & Kneedler forthcoming) . Without good management practices in the states one should not expect innovative policies to be well designed or well implemented.
What distinguishes states that manage programs well from states that do not? How can management be improved, and how much will it cost? These are important questions, but without good indicators of what factors lead to effective management, no systematic analysis is possible.
Recently the Pew Charitable Trusts engaged Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs to conduct GPP. The first report card was issued in 1999 (based on a 1998 survey), followed by a second report card in 2001. The purpose of the GPP was to evaluate the performance of all 50 states in five areas of management Ingraham & Kneedler 2000) . These areas included financial management, human resources management, information technology management, capital management, and managing for results.
The Syracuse scholars are currently working to link their measures of management capacity to policy performance in the states (Hou, Moynihan & Ingraham 2001) . That is an important step, but it is not our objective in this paper. While we do believe that good management practices are a precursor to good public policy implementation, demonstrating the link is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we are interested in what might explain the variance among states in how well they are managed, based on the GPP data.
While the GPP reports have generated widespread interest among public management professionals, there has been little systematic examination of the factors correlated with -and perhaps promoting -the successful management of state government (Knack 2000) . That is our task here.
The results are surprising, both for what we find to be important (e.g., states with professional legislatures perform better, as do states with a strong stock of social capital), and for what we find to be unimportant (e.g., neither a state's dominant political ideology nor the amount of political competition seems to matter). We first describe the Maxwell School data on state government performance. (How the GPP scholars graded each state is discussed briefly below and is the focus of Appendix A.) Then we outline our expectations. We conclude with a call for stronger support for professional legislatures, for improving the social capital infrastructures of states, for actions that enhance the entrepreneurial business climate of states, and for broader distribution of information trumpeting successful policy innovations in the states.
The Management of State Governments
A long literature in Public Administration has tracked the management performance of state agencies in specific areas, such as personnel management and information technology.
Elling's synopsis (1992) explored policy and management areas across all 50 states. Among others, Herbert, Wright and Brudney (1992) called for the careful surveying of management techniques and hoped that the lessons would be widely shared. Once done, those surveys proved valuable in promoting an emerging consensus around best practices (Chi et al. 1997; Brudney, Herbert & Wright 1999) . With support and publicity from Governing magazine, the Maxwell School's efforts have received the bulk of the attention. interviews were conducted and states were evaluated on 35 criteria. The criteria are listed in Appendix A. These criteria were summarized as grades in five categories, from "financial management" to "managing for results." Results for both years are shown in Table 1 . The column marked "Grade Point Average" reports the means across the five categories.
( Table 1 About Here) Consider, for example, the way that "financial management" grades were determined.
Thirteen indicators were used, including whether the state audits financial statements, whether the state adopts its budgets on time, whether the state's revenue forecasts had been accurate, and whether there are management devices to ensure that budgets reflect policy priorities.
Considering these and other elements of financial management, New York received a D+ in 1998 while the Utah government got an A. Unlike Utah and a growing number of states, New York has not adopted performance-based budgeting (Willoughby & Melkers 2001) , and while the grades reveal nothing about how well citizens are represented in either state, we can be assured that the budget processes were better managed in Utah. (Similarly, Utah scored very well in Brudney, Herbert and Wright's (1999) Meanwhile, Alabama, which scored dead last with a D GPA in 1998, only advanced to Cminus over the next two years, joining poorly-performing states such as Arkansas, Hawaii, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Rhode Island at that lowly level. Table 1 shows scores in the five management categories, the primary findings. States that did well in one category tended to succeed in other ways, too. For example, governments that did well in "financial management" usually also placed well in "managing for results," and so on, though some categories correlated more highly than others did. A correlation matrix of the GPP grades is shown in Appendix B, with an A equal to "12" and an F equal to "1." A principal components factor analysis finds one strong underlying "common factor," with each of the five management scores weighted about equally. Accordingly, and for simplicity of interpreting the results, much of our focus is on the "average" grade assigned each state.
Over the last 20 years, various management approaches have been touted as ways to improve government services. Touted techniques include performance based budgeting, total quality management, and treating citizens like consumers (Elling 1999) . Many of these techniques go under the general heading of "performance management," although the "successes" are especially difficult to measure when an agency's task is to prevent lowprobability but very bad outcomes. Indeed, in many states that are developing performance management systems, these new systems are oddly decoupled from policy shops specializing in program evaluation techniques (Blalock & Barnow 2001 , Sparrow 2000 .
The growing literature on how to incubate innovative programs in governments emphasizes giving managers sufficient autonomy to experiment with solutions, to be free to fail, and to expand efforts where successful. As for the state grades, however, the Maxwell School analysis could not identify any particular management approach that worked better than others. "We looked closely," said Dale Jones of the GPP, "and there are no formulas, no two or thee systems or approaches that light the way for the front runners. The common denominator appears to be strong leadership and well integrated systems to improvement management across all the categories, at times with some risk from changing old ways of doing things" (GPP 2001: 2).
Explanations for State Management Performance
We expect that systematic causes, beyond leadership strategies and management techniques relate to successful state government performance. There is a long and useful literature on state governments, notably surrounding how and when states innovate and what the interest group environments are like (Gray, Hanson & Jacob 1999) .
What factors might be driving management performance? We look here at three broad categories. They are government institutions, the political and social environment in the state, and a state's business environment. We try to be agnostic in our starting views, and the explanations may as such appear to be a laundry list. However, we do have priors, namely that states with high social capital, states with careful overview from legislatures, and states with well-managed neighbors will tend to be better run.
We should also note at the outset that we are conducting single equation regressions.
This reduces our ability to interpret results. In some cases, plausible hypotheses allow for causality to run in either direction, possibly with a switch in sign for the regression coefficient. In other cases, multiple explanations may apply for the same finding. There are no easy ways around this shortcoming, and we identify instances in which causality may run either way.
Our analysis employs the 1998 Grading the States scores. We have greater confidence in the1998 data because the Maxwell School has provided extensive background materials on how those grades were generated, and while there were updated grades published in 2001, we have not been able to verify how those grades were derived. Furthermore, most of our dependent variables were measured in years closer to the 1998 survey.
Government Institutions
Just as states range from large to small, urban to rural, and rich to poor, political institutions within states vary widely. Some legislatures are powerful and autonomous, others weak and subject to routine interference from the executive branch. Some governors rule with grand authority, while others are severely limited by state constitutions. Today the governor is usually considered to be the most powerful political player in a state, with good reason:
In the twentieth century, constitutional revision and executive branch reorganization have changed state governments and clarified lines of authority. Governors now have longer terms of office, can succeed themselves, and have more staff for assistance. In addition, they have been given considerable budget authority to help control the executive branch and more veto power to use in their legislative negotiations. (Beyle 1999: 192) Nevertheless, the power and influence of the governor varies considerably across the states. Beyle (1999) draws a useful distinction between personal and institutional powers of governors. Our measure of executive power flows from his analysis of a governor's institutional powers. Three institutional arrangements are critical: a governor's budgetary powers, appointive powers, and whether the governor's cabinet is separately elected.
Brudney Hebert & Wright (1999) found that state agencies with leaders who had been appointed by the governor were more likely to implement "reinventing government" management techniques. We expect that the governor's control over the bureaucracy should be related to better-managed agencies, though we recognize that many readers may expect political control over a bureaucracy to lead to patronage and inefficiency.
Budgetary powers of the governors differ considerably. In Maryland and West Virginia, the governors have full responsibility for devising a budget, and the state legislatures may not independently increase spending in any areas. In Texas and South Carolina, the governors and legislatures share responsibility for proposing budgets but the legislature has unlimited power to change the executive's budget. As for appointive powers, some governors (like those in Ohio and Vermont) have broad and virtually unchecked powers to appoint people to state boards positions without legislative approval. Other governors (in Massachusetts and Georgia, for example) have limited appointment powers, and even the selection of cabinet officials may have to be done under the watchful eye of a separate board, commission, or legislative committee. Finally, the extent to which a governor can claim a statewide electoral mandate is a potentially important power. Five states elect governors much as the nation elects presidents, with a governor and lieutenant governor on the ticket but with no other statewide officers. The remaining states have other officials (such as the attorney general, the secretary of state, the treasurer and public utility authorities) elected at the same time, and these other offices are often held by members of the party opposing the governor and by gubernatorial wannabes. As with appointive powers, a governor's institutional powers are weakened when major cabinet positions are held by people with their own statewide constituencies and whom the governor cannot discipline.
Our measure of a governor's institutional powers is derived from a factor score underlying indicators for the three characteristics just discussed.
1 Budget powers, appointive powers, and the extent to which a governor's team is separately elected are each measured by
Beyle on a 1 to 5 scale. The factor scores vary widely, with the governors of Georgia, South
Carolina and Okalahoma being the institutionally weakest, while the governors in West Virginia, Maryland and New York were rated the strongest. Our variable is scaled to range from 0 to 1, where states scoring 1 have governors with the strongest institutional powers.
We expect that a more powerful governor will be more effective in managing the state Legislative Professionalism. We expect that the capacity of a state legislature to monitor and to improve public programs is directly related to the degree of "professionalism." Poorly managed states are more likely to have unprofessional legislatures as well. Euphemistically labeled "citizen legislatures" by some scholars, part time, poorly paid and under-staffed legislatures are unable to become reservoirs of policy expertise (Franklin 2002 , Kurtz 1992 .
Support staffs make committees more effective in processing legislation; fiscal analysis staffs improve the ability of legislatures to forecast revenues; leadership and caucus staffs enhance the strategic ability of party leaders; and member staffs enable the individual legislator to provide superior constituent services. Moreover, good pay attracts more talented people and enhances the stability of the legislature (Fiorina 1994 Unprofessional legislatures tend to meet only a few months out of the year, leaving the dayto-day running of government up to the executive branch.
A typical way to measure a state legislature's professionalism includes assessing salaries, days in session per year, and state expenditures on the legislative infrastructure (King 2000 , Mooney 1994 , Kurtz 1991 . Our measure of legislative professionalism is adopted from the Kurtz index, (Kurtz 1991; Hamm & Moncrief 1999 ), which we update through the 1990s using King (2000) . Based on this measure, the three most professional legislatures are in California, New York and Michigan, while the three least professional are in New
Hampshire, Wyoming and New Mexico. There would seem to be a logical connection between social capital and the ease of managing a government. This is in part because a citizenry that is happier, healthier, and less prone to violence should be more content. More important, a high level of trust, shared norms, and networks of relationships should assist effective governance directly (Putnam 2000) .
We expect that states with low levels of social capital are more difficult to govern.
When people feel disconnected from their neighbors, they are less likely to participate in solving public problems. They trust their neighbors less; they are less generous; they trust their state governments less; and they are stingier with their tax dollars. (Thomas & Hrebenar 1999) . However, looking across states, these groups are much less powerful than the interest groups of old, such as the railroad industry in late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
We focus here on the relatively recent phenomenon of the emergence of "good government" groups, such as Common Cause and the League of Women Voters. These two groups have established a presence as an active lobbying force across the United States.
These groups are distinctive in that their (public) interest is to promote better government rather than the furthering of private interests, which is the usual goal of business and labor lobbies.
The intended direct causal effect of good government groups is to improve the functioning of their political processes and make them more responsive to the needs of their citizenry, i.e., to make governments more "honest" or more "efficient." Thus, if we could hold other factors constant, we would expect that states with stronger good government groups would perform better than states with weak good government groups.
However, other factors are unlikely to be constant. In particular, states are uneven in how well they are managed, which may influence the formation of good government groups.
Poor government tends to be a spur to the growth of good government groups. In Rhode Island, for example, a series of scandals in the 1980s spurred rapid growth in the membership of Common Cause, just as Nixon campaign excesses proved to be a fundraising boon at the national level. It was also corruption in Rhode Island that helped spur congressman Thomas
Jencks, "the father of civil service reform" in the 1860s, to run for office and lead a national campaign against patronage. Reformers often arise in the places that most need reform. States select from a menu of options for taxation. Those with low sales taxes tend to have higher income taxes, and vice versa. Regardless of the source, the total tax burdens in states vary dramatically. New Hampshire, reflecting its "Live Free or Die" motto, had a 1996 tax burden of 2.45 percent of the state's gross domestic product (GDP). That figure includes local taxes and property taxes. The tax burden in neighboring Vermont was 5.75 percent of the state's GDP, and some of that money goes to providing public kindergartens, which are not available in New Hampshire. The total tax burden, however, need not predict the quality or quantity of state and local government programs. For example, the 1996 tax burden in Mississippi was 6.84 percent of the state GDP, yet its educational and health infrastructures was neglected in the 1990s. Among high school students who graduated in 2001, for example, Mississippi students ranked last in the country on ACT scores (Dirickson 2001) .
Moreover, states with successful programs in one area may do poorly in another: it would be hard to find a state with better roads than one finds in North Carolina, but public schools in North Carolina schools rank among the nation's worst.
We can imagine three different predictions linking a state's tax load with state management performance. The relationship would be negative if corrupt and wasteful governments need to feed themselves. The relationship would be positive if governments cannot be effective with inadequate resources. Or there could be no relationship whatever if
effectiveness depends on what a state does with the resources, not on how many resources they have.
Analysis and Discussion
Our expectations for the effects of the ten independent variables are summarized in Table 2 . Our dependent variable is a state's grade for any of our five areas of performance or overall GPA. To compute our regressions and overall GPA, a grade of A equals 12 points, an A minus 11 points, down to an F equal to one point. Where the hypothesis is marked with a plus sign, we expect a positive impact on state management, and vice versa. We expect that strong governor, a professional legislature, social capital, political competition, good performance by neighboring states, and a strong entrepreneurial climate should mark successful state governments. A full correlation matrix is shown in Appendix B.
( Table 2 About Here)
Where we have a directional hypothesis, we employ 0.10 as a threshold for statistical significance, essentially employing a 0.05 chance of rejecting a true null. Where we have no directional hypothesis, we employ 0.05 as the threshold.
Results from a "seemingly unrelated regression" (SUR) analysis appear in Table 3 .
The coefficients can be read the same way one reads coefficients from standard OLS estimations. We use the SUN technique because the error terms in the other columns were positively correlated, as we'd expect for measures that are essentially tapping into a common dimension (Greene 2000) . Accordingly, the most telling results are likely to be those based on the "average" grade for each state, shown in the final column of Table 3 .
( Table 3 about here)
We find that a state's government institutions, the political and social environment, and a state's business environment each has an impact on state government performance.
States with a strong stock of social capital perform better than other states, and holding everything else in the models equal, social capital is the single best predictor of a how well a state government is managed. Having a strong governor has no statistically discernable impact on how well a state is managed, but states with professional full-time legislatures score better on the GPP measures of management performance. States in which there is considerable "entrepreneurial energy" among businesses tend to be states that are better managed, especially in the "money" areas such as financial and capital management.
Successfully managed states like Minnesota, Virginia, Utah and Washington all have an important factor in common. They are endowed with dense networks of social capital.
Norris' (2001) evaluation of social capital in 47 countries finds that countries high in social capital are more likely to be democratized, and have expansive political rights and civil liberties. Their citizens are more politically tolerant of opposing views, and are more likely to be involved in politics.
Assuming such results apply across states, those with high social capital may be better governed, because "watchful citizens are more likely to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions, and leaders are more likely to believe that their acts will be held to account" (Norris 2001: 3) . The challenges to governing may also be less in such states. Looking across states in the U.S., Putnam (2000:291) finds that crime tends to be lower and health tends to be better in areas where social capital is high, and that better schools, lower mortality rates and less tax evasion, accompany higher social capital.
Moreover, political participation is higher in those states, and even at the local level, citizens in such states are more likely to attend public meetings on town or school affairs (Putnam 2000: 291) . And as Hill and Leighley (1996) Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .10, with directional hypothesis; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
